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CASE COMMENTS

Another basis for affording a presumption of prejudice can be found
in the fact that the defense counsel's presence in the courtroom without the presence of the individual defendant25 is an obvious admission
to the jury that the real defendant is an insurance company. Such a
situation can never be beneficial to the company. 26
The result is that courts making decisions under the proof of prejudice rule are in fact breaking down whatever materialty an insurance
contract has and in a sense are condoning the breach of a contract to
serve an end-compensation. The courts following the prejudice per
se view are following an outmoded approach and are construing the
contract so strictly that often an innocent person is left to bear a
great loss. While the presumption of prejudice rule gives the most
equitable chance to both parties, it still does not afford the best solution. Proof of prejudice or the lack of it is a difficult, if not an impossible task, and the courts never venture to say by what means you
can establish or disestablish this prejudice. The problem of proof is
extremely burdensome for one of the parties, depending on which rule
is applied.
Farley points out a problem that can offer no real equitable solution
to all the parties involved. The dilemma of the cooperation clause and
trial attendance is certain to grow along with the increase in cars,
policyholders, and constant and often delayed litigation.
CHARLES MATrHEW BERGER

DUE PROCESS IN EXTRA-JUDICIAL IDENTIFICATIONS
Criminal convictions of innocent people can result from an erroneous identification by a victim or eyewitness of the crime.' Normal
human failings of perception and memory undoubtedly cause errors
2521 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12831 at 794, says:

It is more commonly thought that in a personal injury suit, there are ordinarily
but t'wo persons before the court, and the trial of the action should be conducted, in so far as possible, without reference to the question of whether
the defendant is insured.... The courts believe that juries are prone to return
larger verdicts where there is insurance coverage, thus subjecting a defendant
to a burden 'which the law does not impose upon him. (Emphasis added.)
262 NVIG ioRE, EvIDENc E § 282a at 133-34 (3d ed. 1940), says:
[A] knowledge of the fact of insurance against liability will motivate the jury
to be reckless in awarding damages to be paid, but by a supposedly wellpursed and heartless insurance company that has already been paid for taking
the risk.
1FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61 (1957); WILUAmS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 105

(3d ed. 1963);

BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT Xiii (1932).

Professor

Borchard

analyzed the convictions of 65 innocent men, of whom 29 were found guilty
because of such identification.
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in identification, 2 but the influence of improper suggestion upon the
identifying witness also plays a part in the naming of an innocent
person as the perpetrator of a crime. 3 Although a witness is protected
from improper suggestion while he is on the stand,4 the original identification of the accused usually occurs under conditions largely controlled by the police.5 Judicial scrutiny of extra-judicial identifications
has been lacking, for courts have treated irregularities in the identification procedure as affecting only the weight of such evidence and not its
admissibility. This means that juries, who are often unduly receptive
to evidence of identification,7 will decide the validity of the identification. The danger of a jury unduly relying on a suggestive identification is increased by the reluctance of courts to give cautionary instructions on the dangers of identification testimony.8 Nor is there
much hope for relief from appellate courts since they generally will
not reverse a conviction unless as a matter of law the evidence of
identity was so weak as to constitute practically no evidence at all.9
2
Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391
(1933); Chenoworth, Police Training Investigates the Fallibility of the Eye-Witvess, 51 J. CuM. L., C. & P.S. 378 (1961); Williams, supra note 1, at 104-24; WALL,
EYE-WITSS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES, 8-11 (1965).
3
WALL, supra note 2, at 26.
4The general rule is that in interrogating a witness on direct examination,
questions which suggest the specific answer desired are improper. See 3 WIGMORF,
EVIDENcE 769 (3d ed. 1940). "The witness is protected against suggestion only while
on the stand, seemingly on the assumption either that intervening influences are
unimportant or that he comes untouched from event to court." Cleary, Evidence
as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAuN. L. REv. 277, 287 (1952).
5
BORcHARD, supra note 1, at xv says: "Expect in the few cases where evidence
is consciously suppressed or manufactured, bad faith is not necessarily attributable
to the police or prosecution; it is the environment in which they live, with an
undiscriminating public clamor for them to stamp out crime and make short
shrift of suspects, which often seems to induce them to pin a crime upon a person
accused."
6E.g., People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001 (1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1963); People v. Boney, 28 IM. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920
(1963); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d 106 (1964); Presley v. State, 224 Md.
550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961). For more cases see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 439, 457 (1960).
But see People v. Evans, 39 Cal. 2d 242, 246 P.2d 636 (1952); People v. Conley, 275
App. Div. 743, 87 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1949), wherein convictions were overturned because improper identification procedures made the identification evidence insufficient to support the verdicts.
7"The only type of evidence more damning than personal identification is a
confession." 2 U.C.L.A.,. Rv. 552, 556 (1955); WALL, supra note 2, at 19-23. See
also the discussion of the case of Adolph Beck in WILIAMS, supra note 1, at 110-12.
SUnited States v. Moia, 251 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1958).
9
"We have repeatedly held that all inferences must be construed in the light
most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and that where there is evidence to
support a verdict we will not disturb a finding of a jury." State v. Miranda, 98
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Recent cases recognize that extra-judicial identifications may violate
due process. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided in Palmer v. Peyton,1° a federal habeas corpus proceeding brought by a state prisoner," that the identification procedure
used by the police violated the defendant's constitutional rights as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Palmer involved voice
identification of an accused rapist. On March 27, 1957, Mrs. Britt, a
white woman, was raped and robbed. She stated that her attacker was
a Negro about the same height as she, that he was wearing a feed bag
over his head and an orange colored shirt, that he had been drinking,
and that he spoke with a high, childlike voice. The following day a
Negro youth informed the police that Palmer claimed to have raped
a white woman the day before. Palmer was arrested, and Mrs. Britt
was informed by the police that they had a Negro suspect they wanted
her to hear. She was brought to the station house and shown the
2
orange shirt that Palmer had been wearing at the time of his arrest.'
She then sat in a room adjacent to the one in which Palmer was questioned, and, after listening to Palmer's voice for a few minutes through
Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721, 725 (1965), reversed on constitutional grounds in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Hood, 140 Cal. App. 2d 585, 295 P.2d
525 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
10359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). The United States Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in another identification case, United States ex rel. Stovall
v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 1000 (1966).
Stovall was identified when he was brought into the victim's hospital room handcuffed, and surrounded by several policemen. The prisoner's attorney argued that
since extra-judicial identifications are a legitimate tool of police investigation and
the results are admitted at trial as evidence of guilt, any identification procedure
must, as with confessions, comply with some minimal standard of fairness. In
Brief, 1 Cmat. L. Buu.. 3, 5, 8 (March 1965). In this case the Second Circuit
stated that an "identification procedure could be so unfair as to amount to a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee." 355 F.2d at 738.
However, the court in Stovall went on to say that this identification was not
"so unfair" and therefore the weight to be given the identification was for the
jury.
1lPalmer had two previous trials. On June 22, 1957, a jury found him guilty
and fixed his punishment at death. The judge declared a mistrial and set aside
the conviction. On January 11, 1958, his second trial ended with a hung jury. At
his third trial, Palmer waived his right to a jury and was tried and sentenced by
the judge who had presided at the two previous trials. Although no appeal was
taken from his conviction, in 1962 Palmer petitioned the Supreme Court of
Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus. This petition was denied, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari in February, 1963. Palmer v. Cunningham,
372 U.S. 921 (1963). Palmer's petition for federal habeas corpus was dismissed
after a hearing by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
on12July 10, 1964. This is the decision appealed to the Court of Appeals.
1t is unclear as to whether the shirt was shown to the witness before listening to the voice, or immediately thereafter.
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a partially opened door, she identified his voice as that of her assailant. Palmer was convicted and sentenced to consecutive terms of life
imprisonment for rape and forty years for robbery. Eight years later
the Fourth Circuit held that the identification procedure violated due
process and Palmer was granted a writ of habeas corpus setting aside
his conviction and directing his release, unless the state afforded him
a new trial "uninfected by the voice identification testimony." 13
The fact that the witness was informed that a Negro suspect had
been arrested, that she was shown the orange shirt, that the prisoner
was not identified in a line-up but instead his voice was the only one
presented for identification, combined to convince the court that the
state had generated a "highly suggestive atmosphere that . . .could
not have failed to affect her judgment." 14 The court also noted that the
danger of suggestion is increased when the identification is based on
only one facet of the suspect's total personality. "This is especially so
when the identifier is presented with no alternative choices; there is
then a strong predisposition to overcome doubts and fasten guilt upon
the lone suspect." 15
Courts have been reluctant to exclude evidence of extra-judicial identifications because such identifications are considered more reliable
than identifications made at trial. 16 Extra-judicial identifications are
usually made shortly after the crime when the witness' memory is fresh,
whereas identification at the trial have little probative value because
"the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have
intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness's mind." 17
However, the probative value of an extra-judicial identification will
be weakened if it is made under circumstances which suggest the
guilty identity of the suspect. Professor Wigrnore warned that although the original identification is generally more reliable, "no parr
of the field of proof has been so defective in the use of the common
13359 F.2d at 203.
141d. at 201.

151bid.
16United States v. Forzano, 190 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1951); People v. Gould, 54
Cal. 2d 621, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960); State v. Frost, 105 Conn. 326,

135 Ad. 446 (1926). These cases deal primarily with the hearsay objection to the
introduction into evidence of an extra-judicial identification. For a discussion of
the Gould case in particular, see 8 U.C.L.A.. REv.467 (1961); 109 U. PA. L. Rav.

1182 (1961). For a comprehensive discussion of the hearsay problem with regard
to extra-judicial identifications, see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960); 4 WIGAMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1130 (3d ed. 1940); 30 RocKY MT. L. Rav. 332 (1958).

17People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 7 Cal. Rpr. 273, 354 P.2d 865, 867 (1960).
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sense of psychology. And at no point is the danger greater of condemning an innocent person." -1
Extra-judicial identifications may be made in several ways. The two

principal procedures used by police to identify a suspect are the
"show-up" and the "line-up." The show-up, a practice frequently 19

used by American police, 20 consists of bringing a single suspect before a witness for identification purposes, whereas in a line-up the
accused is placed in a line with three or four other persons.
A show-up is strongly suggestive of guilt because "the emotions of
the victim .

.

. create a predisposition to believe the worst of a per-

son brought before him as the probable offender, especially when
there is no alternative suspect." 21 In regard to show-ups, Professor
XVigmore states that "there is no excuse for jeopardizing the fate of
innocent men by such clumsy antiquated methods; a recognition under
such circumstances is next to worthless." 22 Suggestion may be substantially increased by seeing the suspect handcuffed and guarded by
policemen,2 telling the witness that the person to be shown was the
actual perpetrator of the crime, 24 making a suspect dress in clothing

similar to the eye-witness's description,2 or showing a picture of the
accused to the witness before the identification. 26 However, "no

1'Sligmore, Corroborationby Witness' Identification of an Accused on Arrest,
25 ILL. L. REv. 550, 551 (1931).
19E.g., People v. Branch, 127 Cal. App. 438, 274 P.2d 31 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
Taylor v. State, 75 Ga. App. 205, 42 S.E.2d 926 (1947); People v. Cobb, 52 II.
App. 2d 332, 202 N.E.2d 56 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1964); Brown v.
Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 29, 186 N.E.2d 612 (1962).
20English Courts and policemen apparently are more concerned with the identification procedure. Thus, if the identification is secured improperly, an appellate
court can quash any resulting conviction if the trial judge fails to sufficiently point
out to the jury the dangers of such an identification. See: Paul, Identification of
Accused Persons, 12 Ausma. L.J. 42 (1938); Paiken, Identification as a Facet of
Criminal Law, 29 CAN. B. REv. 372 (1951); Annot., 12 CRIMINAL REPORTS 328
(Can.) (1951); 10 HALsBtmY's LAws OF ENGLAND 440 (3d ed. 1955); 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 786a (3d ed. 1940).
21BoRcHAu, supra note 1, at 84. See also, WILLIAM s, supra note 2, at 121; WALL,
supra note 2, at 28-29; Gorphe, Sbowing Prisonersto Witnesses for Identification,
1 Am.
J. POLICE Sci. 79, 82 (1930).
22
4 VIGMO.E, EVIDENCE § 1130 n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
23
See, United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, supra note 10; Gorphe, supra note
21, at 82; Wigmore, supra note 18, at 551.
24
See, Hilson v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 449, 276 S.W. 272 (1925).
25People v. Conley, supra note 6. (Beside having to dress-up in certain clothing,
the suspect was forced to remove the glasses which he habitually wore. The court
held that the identification procedure was improper and conviction was against
the26weight of the evidence.)
People v. Evans, supra note 6, at 642. The court decided it could hardly be
considered fair "to show a complaining wimess the picture of one man and then
take her into a room where that man is the only occupant."
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matter how artificial or rigged the show-up is, the courts are disposed to treat it in terms of weight rather than admissibility." 27
Placing the suspect in a line-up will naturally reduce the chances
of an erroneous identification provided that the line-up is conducted
fairly.28 Yet the value of the line-up and the reliability of any identification will be as weak as one from a show-up if special attention is
called to the suspect by telling the witness the suspect's name and
then requiring the members of the line-up to state their names, 20 dressing the suspect differently from the others,30 requiring members of
the line-up to try on clothes that obviously fit only the suspect,3 '
showing a witness a picture of the suspect prior to the line-up, 32 or
using people in the line-up who are known to the identifying witness. 3
The need to discourage these suggestive methods of identification is
obvious. However, courts have repeatedly held that there is no requirement that a suspect should be placed in a line-up since line-ups
are merely designed to assist the jury in weighing the evidence relating to identification.m3 4 Thus, even if the identification was secured
the identification eviby police suggestion, this fact would not render
83
dence incompetent but only affect its weight.
Palmer is significant because it is the first case to hold that the element of suggestion was so strong as to make the extra-judicial identification a denial of due process, thus making the identification evidence inadmissible. 36 It may be argued that Palmer is limited to its fact
situation, a voice identification under suggestive conditions. However,
courts have generally regarded "the sense of hearing as reliable as that
of any other of the five senses" 37 and there is no apparent reason why
27

Cleary, supra note 4, at 284 n.40.

28

For a list of "line-up" rules proposed by one writer, see 2 U.C.L.A.L.

REV.

552,557 (1955).
2

9People v. Hicks, 22 Ill. 2d 364, 176 N.E.2d 810, 811 (1961).
3OPresley v. State, supra note 6.
v. Parham, supra note 6.
31People
2
3 People v. Krazik, 397 Ii. 202, 73 N.E.2d 297 (1947).

33People v. Boney, supra note 6; People v. James, 218 Cal. App. 2d 166, 32 Cal.
Rptr.283 (1963).

34People v.Branch,supra note 19.
3SPeople v. Crenshaw, 15 Ill.
2d 458, 155 N.E.2d 599 (1959), cert. denied, 359

U.S. 997 (1959).

6
3 Some cases have held that the improper identification procedure made the
identification evidence too weak to support a guilty verdict. See, People v. Evans,
supra
note 6; People v. Conley, supra note 6.
37

Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 600, 242 S.W. 604, 607 (1922); accord, State
v. Bell, 300 S.W. 504 (Mo. 1927). In Bland v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 563, 89 S.W.2d
996, 997 (1935), the court stated: "There seems to be no more similarity in the

voice of different people than there is in their physical appearance." See also,
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Palmer should be limited to voice identification cases. Rather than being a limited decision, Palmer appears to set broad guide lines for
future extra-judicial identifications. Palmer suggests that trial judges
scrutinize all identification procedures and require such procedures to
meet "'those canons of decency and fairness' established as part of
the fundamental laws of the land." 3 Translating this principle into
specifics, Palmer warns against exposing a witness to an atmosphere
of suggestiveness and an absence of choices. Palmer thus casts doubt on
the show-up as a proper police procedure since a show-up inherently
involves suggestion and a lack of alternatives. Whether a show-up will
ever be ruled improper in itself remains to be seen, but it seems clear that
Palmer has taken a proper step in encouraging trial courts to scrutinize
more closely extra-judicial identifications. Law enforcement authorities substantially control the environment under which most extrajudicial identifications are made, and it seems wise to require them to
furnish the witness with alternatives and an atmosphere relatively free
of suggestive influences. If they fail to do so, the trial judge may in
his discretion refuse to allow evidence of this extra-judicial identification to be placed before the jury, and the prosecution will have
to rely on a courtroom identification3 9
MALCOLM

G.

CRAWvFoRD

Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. 706 (1907); Small v. State, 165 Neb. 381, 85
N.V.2d 712 (1957); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 201 Pa. Super. 448, 193 A.2d
833 (1963). But see, Reamer v. United States, 229 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1956); People
v. Sher, 8 Misc. 2d 359, 167 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957) (Weight to be

given to voice identification was for trial judge to determine). Evidence of voice
identification has been admitted even when obtained under suggestive conditions.
State v. Simmons, 22 Conn. Supp. 360, 173 A.2d 134 (Cir. Cr. App. 1961); Commonwealth v. Guerro, 207 N.E.2d 887 (Mass. 1965); Dyson v. State, 238 Md. 398, 209
A.2d 609 (1965), (show-up conditions); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d 106
(1964); People v. Jones, supra note 32 (improperly conducted line-up); Taylor v.
State, supra note 20 (identifying witness instructed to call the jail and ask to speak

to the suspect).
38359 F.2d at 202.

39Naturally there is danger that a court-room identification will be greatly
influenced by an improper extra-judicial identification. The comment in 30
ROCKY Mr. L. REv., supra note 10, at 340-41 states that this identification should
also be excluded. Cf., United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 742
(1966) (Concurring opinion). Cautionary instructions to the jury on the possible
dangers of an extra-judicial identification affecting a courtroom identification
might be the best solution to this problem.

